THE END OF "CONFRONTATION": THE DEBIT SIDE

Created: 8/16/1966

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CENTRAL IHTELLIGEJICE .

OFFICE OF RATIONAL

IS;-"

6

HHtoRANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The End of "Confrontation": The Debit Side

conclusions

A. The end of confrontation will eliminate the threat of open warfare between Indonesia and the Commonwealth, and will permit Indonesia to focus much-needed attention on its domestic affairs, especially in the economic field.

toward the resident Chinese, and to render the latter less tolerant of Malay political domination.

C. Though Indonesia will forswear efforts to subvert Malaysia, the Djakarta regime Is unlikely to abandon Ita long-term ambition to become the dominant power among peoples of Malay blood.

APPFOKD FOP0

DISCUSSION

1. Indonosia has forajally terminated its three-year canpaign of political, economic, and paramilitary harassment of Malaysia. Resumption of full diplomatic relations may require additional aonths or even years if Sultarno retains his present ability toomplete rapprochement. Sukarnothe end of confrontation willrofound iapact not only on Indonesian-Malaysian relationships per se,butroad range of domestic and foreign issues in both countries.

2. Indonesian-laiayBian Relations. The politically-dominant

Malaya of Malaysia and tho overwhelming majority of Indonesiansommon racial, religious, and cultural background. They are not "foreign" to one another except in narrow political terms. In these circumstances, the end of confrontation will signify much more than the resumption of friendly relations between neighboring states. It vlll have many aspectsamily reunion.

with both sides especially Malaysia, eager to renew and expand previous close tiesyetrospect of suspicions between the affectionate relations.

3- Inevitablybecause of its superior sire, population, resources, military power, and political and cultural dynamismIndonesia will exert far greater influence on Malaysia than Malaysia on Indonesia. This vaa demonstrated ln the decade or so following World War II, vftea the modernization of the Kalay language and the considerable literary achieveoents of Indonesians profoundly Influenced Malay youth and intellectuals, many of whom were also inspired by Indonesian revolutionary heroes and Impressed by Indonesia'a standing on the world scene under Sukarno. In Malayan political life, Indonesian Influence vas strong amongndomontalists who advocated an Islamic state and suppression of the country's large Chinese population, and among ultra-nationals ata who would achieve domination of the Chinese of Malaya and Singapore by outright union of Malaya with Indonesia. Pro-Communist Indonesians, and in some casesjakarta government itself, provided major assistance to many leftist Kalay political groupings.

k. The attraction of tndoneeie and its ideologles for the Haley intellectual, tlie politically active youth, the religious extreDist, and the ultra-nationalist has undoubtedly survived the period of confrontation. Even at thef the Indonesian campaign. Malay aniooaltiea vere not great and vere focusaed primarily on Sukarno, duhandrio, and the Indonesian Cooicuniat Party. Once contacts between the two states are legitimatized, the attraction ia likely to grow aa before. Theill be aided by the presence in peninsular Malaysia of more than one ail11on persona born in Indonesia or of Indonesian parentage. There will be at least two new features In the political currents flowing froa Indonesia to Malaysia in the post-confrontation period: Suharto's Indonesia ia unlikely to foster leftist doctrines; and anti-Chineae movements will have even stronger Indonesian 3upport.

5. In concrete terms, what will the revival of Indonesian influence mean for Malaysia? In the short term; It probablytrengthening of pan-t'alay and anti-Chinese tendencies, and Increased electoral appeal for Malay parties and factions opposed to the present system of "multiracial" government. Similarly, it would Indicate Increased domestic oppositioneasonable

9. Tim Ovcrm-asSu. Singapore, and Borneo. The exacerbation of "the Chinese question" may be the single nost unsettling consequence of the end of confrontation. In peninsular Malaysia, in Singapore, and in Sarawak and Sabah as well, over

h Bullion ethnic Chinese are approlieniive as Malaysia nrcpcrc3 to embrace an Indonesian regime pervaded by dislike and suspicion of all Chinese. It seams likely that some Chinese fearsealised. Singapore will not have an easy time ln its commercial dealings with Indonesia and Malaysia. There could be retrogression

in Sarawak and Sak.an, ethnic Chinese hopesroportionate share ln tba administration could be dashed, in sun, Malaysia is less likely than before to enlist tho loyalties of its Chinese residents.

In the short tern, neither peninsular Malaysia nor Singapore is likely to go up ln flames because of Chinese In the peninsula, the existing conservative Chinese leadership will probably retain its "low posture" to avoid provoking Malay leaders. The Chinese of Singapore will prohably continue to support Lee Kuan Yew's patient andapproach to survivalostile milieu, though some frustrated Chinese youth may turn toward more radical solutions.

Sarawakore critical orohlert. Its nro-Coorjunlst underground terrorist organisation is slxable and is

supoorted by tons of thousands of rural and urban Chinese. If Kuala Lumpur attempts to deny theegitimate political role in local and national affairs, the insurgent movement would

gain recruits. The clandestine Communist organization has

received training and arms from the Indonesians, but it also derives doctrine and probably guidance from Communist China. In anyhe end of confrontation Is most unlikely to lead to

12. Indonesia and Borneo. Though Indonesia will pahllcly forswear confrontation and will probably abandon the bulk of its paraoilitari' activities it will almost certainly continue its efforts to subvert Sarawak, Sabah, and Brunei. There is still sentiment in Indonesian military and political circles for achieving some sort of condominium with Kuala Lumpur over northern Borneo, if not for evicting the lialaysian government completely. To keep the possibility open, the Indonesians are likely to continue to support, though inariety of Borneo liberation groups and leaders, and even some of their erstwhile

alliesthe Sarawak Chlneae- They could uie disorders they themselves had encouraged as an excuse for Intervening in northern Borneo.

13- In the immediate aftermath ofuharto government vlU focus on domestic problems of politicaland economic rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the Indonesian leaders do viev themselves aa the rightful leaders of the Haley realmfrom southern Thailand through the Phillpplneend the aucceaaors of Britain and the US aa the paramount power in tho area. For the present the Philippines are out of their reach. It ia almost certain, however, that Indonesian ambitions in halayaia will not be forgotten asers-on of confrontation ends.

UIHIII.ncFIIYrs 10

FOR TiE BOARD OF RATIONAL ESTIMATES:

Acting Chairman

Original document.

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